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THE NOT SO PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE 
FUTILE SEARCH: TRIBE ON PROCEDURALISM IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Frank I. Michelman∗ 
I 
From me, just now, there can be no more fitting tribute to my friend and hugely 
admired colleague, Laurence Tribe, than a retrospect on his famous essay of 1980, “The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories.”1  “Persistence,” as I will 
call it for short, has the look of a piéce d’occasion⎯the occasion being, of course, the 
publication in 1980 of John Hart Ely’s great work on constitutional theory, Democracy 
and Distrust.  But there was more to it than that, or so I mean to suggest.  Rejoining to 
Ely in “Persistence,” Tribe picked up on a development in American constitutional 
theory that he called puzzling and disturbing: An aspiration, as he put it, “to purge 
constitutional discourse of inevitably controversial claims about substantive rights and 
values.”2  I am going to suggest that Tribe was responding there to intellectual currents 
in which he himself had been involved and Ely may or may not have been⎯a budding 
proceduralistic turn, as I shall call it, in liberal thought about how to make 
constitutionalism the answer to a problem of political and legal legitimacy, while still 
accepting and respecting the hard social facts of ethical plurality and diversity. 
Always dogging at the heels of liberal political and legal thought is the question of 
the moral justification for applications of organized social force⎯governmental and 
legal force⎯to supposedly free and equal individuals, in conditions of deep 
disagreement among them over basic values and aims for society and for individual 
lives.  Call this the question of political and legal legitimacy.3  Might the answer to it 
possibly lie in a body of constitutional law, aptly conceived, construed, and 
administered?  Elaboration and dissection of that hope have been a major preoccupation 
 
  ∗    Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.  Thanks to David Barron for helpful 
comments. 
  1.  Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 
1063 (1980).  
 2.  Id. at 1079. 
 3.  See e.g. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 137, 217 (Columbia U. Press 1993) (labeling his proposed 
answer to this question “the liberal principle of legitimacy”); Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political 
Legitimacy, 16 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 215, 218 (1987) (equating the question of political legitimacy with that of 
finding “a way of justifying coercively imposed political and social institutions to the people who have to live 
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for the field of study and debate we call constitutional theory, in which Democracy and 
Distrust and “Persistence” both hold deservedly honored places. 
It is not legal theorists alone who have pondered the idea of a pivotal role for 
constitutional law in the redemption of political legitimacy on liberal terms.  In recent 
decades, a like idea has drawn attention from leading political philosophers, in the 
United States and beyond, in what we may call a proceduralistic turn in the normative, 
political-theoretic speculations and arguments of liberal-minded thinkers.  Very roughly 
(more on this later): If justification for the force of law can be found in the generally 
accepted, morally merited authority of the constituted processes whence contested laws 
issue, then no number of intractable disagreements over the substantive merits of 
particular laws can threaten it; legitimacy becomes secure in the midst of a great deal of 
substantive moral and ethical dissensus. 
Tribe’s “Persistence” essay, I say⎯in a phrase that will require some 
explaining⎯“picked up on” this proceduralizing turn in the liberal quest for grounds of 
political legitimacy.  A few years after its publication, in what (superficially, at least) has 
the look of a short sequel to “Persistence,” Tribe in fact would write of a “futile search 
for legitimacy.”4  Being now myself caught up in my own examination of the 
proceduralistic turn and its hopes for legitimacy-via-constitutionalism,5 I am nagged by 
the memory of Professor Tribe’s interventions.  Today or tomorrow, I need to take the 
measure of their anticipations of my own puzzlements. 
II 
Key to much of what I want to say about “Persistence” and Tribe’s related writings 
is a distinction I am about to launch between democratic processed-based constitutional 
theories (“DPCT”), epitomized for Tribe and countless others by John Ely’s masterpiece, 
and liberal proceduralist constitutional theories (“LPCT”), for which my exemplar will 
be John Rawls.6  (And here I do not so much mean the John Rawls of the first great 
 
  4.  “The Futile Search for Legitimacy” is the title of the opening chapter in Tribe’s book of 1985, 
Constitutional Choices.  See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 3 (Harvard U. Press 1985). 
  5. For some published outcroppings, see e.g. Frank I. Michelman, The Problem of Constitutional 
Interpretive Disagreement, in Habermas and Pragmatism (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., Routledge 2002) 
[hereinafter Michelman, Disagreement]; Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights under Popular 
Constitutionalism, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 121, 141-53 (2006) [hereinafter Michelman, Unenumerated]; Frank I. 
Michelman,  Reply to Baker and Balkin, 39 Tulsa  L. Rev. 649 (2004); Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: 
Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 345 (2003); Frank I. Michelman, 
Is the Constitution a Contract For Legitimacy? 8 Rev. Const. Stud. 101 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, 
Contract]; Frank I. Michelman, Postmodernism, Proceduralism, and Constitutional Justice: A Comment on 
van der Walt and Botha, 9 Constellations 246 (2002) [hereinafter Michelman, Postmodernism]. 
  6.  On Rawls as constitutional proceduralist, see Michelman, Postmodernism,  supra n. 5, at 255-61.   
Others writing in the liberal proceduralist vein include Thomas Nagel, Charles Larmore, Jürgen Habermas and 
Thomas McCarthy.  See e.g. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality 33 (Oxford U. Press 1991) (connecting 
legitimacy to “unanimity⎯not about everything but about the controlling framework within which more 
controversial decisions will be made”); Charles Larmore, The Moral Basis of Liberalism, 96 J. Phil. 599, 606 n. 
8 (1999) (connecting the liberal principle of legitimacy to the idea of constitutional principles that can be object 
of reasonable agreement); Thomas McCarthy, Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and 
Habermas in Dialogue, 105 Ethics 44, 57 (1994) (approvingly linking Habermas to the idea that those who 
regard a political system as “basically just” can accept as legitimate specific, resulting decisions that they do 
not approve); Michelman, Disagreement, supra n. 5, at 132-33 (addressing Habermas).  MICHELMAN – FINAL  3/6/2008  8:13:18 PM 
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book, vintage 1971,7 as the John Rawls of the second great book, vintage 1993.8)  
Whereas “Persistence” ostensibly directed its fire against Ely-style democratic process-
based constitutional theories, I aim to show how the challenges (“puzzles”) that Tribe 
seemed most intent on framing there would have been more aptly directed to liberal 
proceduralist constitutional theories.  Did Tribe’s essay in fact conflate or confuse these 
two types of theories?  If so, why so?  Those are my leading questions. 
Democratic process-based constitutional theory first.  A “thoroughly democratic” 
political system, let us say, is one that gives effect to the acts and choices of popularly-
based, majoritarian political institutions, fairly run and maintained, on any and all topics 
not excluding those affecting fundamental rights or fundamental values.  DPCT’s aim 
and ideal is a constitution written, construed, and carried out so as to establish and 
sustain a thoroughly democratic political system.  The theory sees, however, the danger 
that the acts of democratic institutions will sometimes place in doubt or at risk their own 
democratic character⎯either in transacting the business at hand or for the future when 
that business takes effect⎯according to some favored, normative model for a proper 
democracy.  In Ely-style DPCT, the normative model is that of what Ely called 
“representative democracy,” and the teaching is threefold: (1) Courts should construe the 
Constitution, and use constitutional review, to ensure that only decisions duly made 
according to the model take effect, while (2) decisions duly made according to model are 
to be accepted and heeded by the courts, no further questions asked, except that (3) 
constitutional checks should be available, and should be applied by courts, as necessary 
to keep such decisions from upending model-form representative democracy for the 
future. 
Liberal proceduralist constitutional theories are quite different in principle, and 
they take a bit more explaining.  Their aim and ideal is what I shall call a “legitimation-
worthy” constitution.  To judge a constitution legitimation-worthy is to find that its 
prescriptions, taken all together to comprise a unified political system, have a special 
kind of virtue or merit: They are such as to cast a mantle of moral justification over 
enforcement against everyone of approximately all of the laws, rulings, and decrees that 
issue in compliance with the system they comprise.  The aim is thus a constitution whose 
terms are such as to allow you or me to say, with clear conscience, that any law whose 
process of enactment and whose content pass muster under its requirements can ipso 
facto be deemed a law with which all within range have good enough reason to comply, 
and which we, therefore, are justified in enforcing. 
A legitimation-worthy constitution thus allows for “proceduralization” of 
judgments regarding the moral permissibility of collaboration in the enforcement of laws 
of uncertain and disputed moral and other merits.  Instead of asking whether the 
worrisome law is good or bad or right or wrong in substance, one asks whether it is 
“constitutional,” a technical and a procedural question.  If the answer is yes, those who 
 
 7.  See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard U. Press 1971). 
 8.  See Rawls, supra n. 3, at 137, 217 (1993) (proposing a “liberal principle of legitimacy,” which grounds 
legitimacy in the conformity of legislative and other political acts to a constitution meeting certain standards); 
see also Michelman, Unenumerated, supra n. 5, at 141-43; Michelman, Contract, supra n. 5, at 248-50, 255-
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enforce the law are deemed justified in doing so, no matter how morally or otherwise 
deficient anyone, possibly including the enforcers, may find that law to be.9  Judgments 
regarding the legitimacy⎯meaning the morally justified enforceability⎯of laws are in 
that way proceduralized.  The burden of justification is displaced from the law in 
question to the legally constituted political system whence it issued.  So what a 
legitimation-worthy constitution gives us, if we have one, is not just a procedure but a 
procedure imbued with a special virtue.  It gives us, to wit, a legitimation procedure. 
But how, then⎯according to what standard or test⎯do we judge a given 
constitution’s legitimation-worthiness?  Standards must vary according to the moral 
premises underlying the particular brand of proceduralist constitutional theory in play.  
In the liberal variant (LPCT) whose imminent burgeoning is what I think Tribe caught 
on to in “Persistence,” a constitution’s legitimation-worthiness rests on a judgment⎯I 
put this very roughly⎯that everyone affected, ranking his or her own projects and 
commitments as no more, but also no less, deserving of consideration than anyone else’s, 
should be able to accept that constitution as an apt and fair set of governance 
arrangements for an ethically and otherwise diverse population of free and equal persons 
whose various aims, hopes, and projects will often come into conflict.  I shall sometimes 
later call this the standard of the constitution’s presumable agreeability to everyone.  (To 
give this idea a bit of substance, and to anticipate later discussion, consider whether an 
individual’s putative moral right to worship as he pleases supplies the only reason for a 
constitutional-legal guarantee of freedom of worship.) 
It should by now be apparent that DPCT and LPCT address themselves, at least in 
the first instance, to different (but not unrelated) concerns.  The rock-bottom concern of 
DPCT is, simply, democracy.  The aim is to guard against the throttling of democracy 
either by constitutionalism (“government by judiciary”) or by democracy’s own internal 
breakdowns, disorders, and falls from grace.  The rock-bottom concern of LPCT lies 
deeper.  That concern is legitimacy, and legitimacy does not conceptually presuppose 
democracy.  The aim is to explain the possibility of morally justifiable governmental and 
legal force for that population I mentioned of free and equal persons having diverse and 
conflicting interests, projects, and values.  It is to redeem the possibility of liberally 
legitimate government and law⎯government and law on terms that all as free and equal 
should find acceptable⎯from the threat posed by perceived facts of widespread, 
intractable, potentially divisive disagreements over questions of values and rights.   
Democracy might be the answer or an indispensable part of it⎯most liberals think it 
is⎯but it also might not be.  For those in quest of legitimacy, the legitimating force of 
democracy cannot be presupposed; it must rather be looked into. 
Faced with the inevitability, in modern, free societies, of deep and persisting 
disagreement over “fundamental values” (we may as well use John Ely’s pet term for 
 
  9.  How does it work if our judgment is that only constitutions imposing certain kind of positive, protective 
obligations on governments can be legitimation-worthy?  It seems that no law can pass legitimacy-muster 
under such a constitution unless the government is currently in compliance with all the positive obligations 
required for constitutional legitimation-worthiness.  That may be one reason (it surely is not the only reason) 
for resistance to the inclusion of positive economic, social, and environmental guarantees in constitutions. MICHELMAN – FINAL  3/6/2008  8:13:18 PM 
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this field of dissensus10) it seems we cannot rest our hopes for political legitimacy on 
any expectation of a convergence of judgments regarding the moral or other substantive 
merits of the run of ground-level political outcomes⎯legislative acts, judicial rulings, 
executive decrees.11  Anxiety results for liberals seeking justification for political and 
legal coercion (i.e., political legitimacy), and from it springs the thought that judgments 
regarding legitimacy must be severed from judgments regarding the substantive merits of 
ground-level outcomes as they come along, to be linked instead to claims respecting the 
deservingness of acceptance by everyone⎯the presumable agreeability to everyone⎯of 
the constituted processes from which the outcomes issue. 
LPCT thus takes as focal a question about the grounds of justification for coercion 
by law that DPCT treats as already settled.  DPCT takes as already established (perhaps, 
as with Ely, on partly historical grounds12) the legitimation-worthiness, in these United 
States, of our constitutionally prescribed, representative-democratic form and process of 
government.  Liberal proceduralist theory does not.  It addresses the antecedent question, 
about what a legitimation-worthy constitution for a country like ours would have to 
provide for, and so it cannot start by excluding the possibility that such a constitution 
would have to contain some of the very sorts of substantive constitutional guaranties that 
Ely-style process theory rejects.  No doubt that is the conclusion reached, after argument, 
by some participants in LPCT debate, those who find that the best hope for a liberally 
legitimation-worthy constitutional practice⎯one that everyone as free and equal can 
accept as a legitimation procedure⎯lies in much the sort of constitutional practice 
endorsed by DPCT, in which external constriction of the lawmaking choices of 
representative-democratic political bodies is allowed, if at all, only for the sake of 
sustaining a properly representative-democratic political process.13 
Others, however, emphatically disagree.  For John Rawls and his allies, any 
liberally legitimation-worthy constitution⎯any constitutional system that can plausibly 
claim acceptability to everyone as free and equal⎯will have to be one that includes 
substantive guarantees having, in all honesty, nothing to do with preserving or perfecting 
the processes of representative democracy.14  That will make the system problematic, if 
not downright objectionable, in the sight of Ely-style DPCT.  For Rawls, it is fairly 
arguable that a legitimation-worthy constitution must guarantee a woman’s right to 
choose termination of a pregnancy.15  For Ely, such a right is unfit for 
constitutionalization because it is unrelated to securing or protecting representative 
democracy.16  Thus the Ely-style DPCT that Tribe mainly addressed in “Persistence” 
and the LPCT on which (I say) he picked up toward the close of that essay are always 
 
  10.  John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 43 (Harvard U. Press 1980). 
 11.  See generally Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Clarendon Press 1999). 
 12.  See infra pt. IV; id. at nn. 34-37, 53-55 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See e.g. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 
491 (1997); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006). 
 14.  See generally James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy (U. Chicago Press 2006); Rawls, 
supra n. 3. 
 15.  John  Rawls,  The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in John Rawls: Collected Papers 573, 605-06 
(Samuel Freeman ed., Harvard U. Press 1999); Rawls, supra n. 3, at 243-44 n. 32. 
 16.  See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973). MICHELMAN – FINAL  3/6/2008  8:13:18 PM 
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living on the edge of incompatibility. 
III 
Toward the close of “Persistence,” Tribe wrote of a certain “aspiration” that he 
found hard to explain, and moreover thought was leading to a troublesome “situation” 
and “prospect” for American constitutional theory.
17  The puzzling aspiration⎯which 
Tribe seemingly attributed to Ely, although, as I shall be suggesting, with questionable 
warrant for doing so⎯was, to repeat, that of “purg[ing] constitutional discourse of 
inevitably controversial claims about substantive rights and values.”18  The problematic, 
resulting situation was, simply, that in which the said aspiration has theory in its grip.  
The aspiration to steer constitutional discourse clear of controversial substance, Tribe 
wrote in his essay’s closing passage, “apparently strike[s] chords so responsive, 
accord[s] with beliefs so deep,” that mere demonstrations of its impossibility or absurdity 
for us (we being otherwise conditioned as we are) are “beside the point”19⎯by which, I 
take it, Tribe meant that such demonstrations have no prayer of putting a stop to the 
quest for a strictly procedure-focused, substance-free constitutional discourse, so strong 
and deep is the motivation behind it.  This was a case⎯Tribe more or less politely 
conveyed⎯of the wish being father to the thought, “as though” (marvelous line!) “such 
theories could banish divisive controversies from . . . the realm of constitutional 
discourse by relegating those controversies to the unruly world of power.”20  And what, 
Tribe wondered at the very end, does it say about “our situation, and about the prospect 
for constitutional theory, that views so deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful 
a grip upon our thought?”21 
A fine question, no doubt, but what was it doing in an essay on Ely’s book?  On 
Tribe’s own showing, as we are about to see, Democracy and Distrust does not in fact 
evince the aspiration to purge constitutional discourse of controversial claims about 
values.  Such an aspiration has a lot more to do with the aims and concerns of LPCT, 
which Tribe’s essay did not separately mention or address, than it has to do with DPCT, 
for which Ely stands as exemplar.  Tribe’s worry about “our situation” and its cloudy 
prospect for constitutional theory seems misdirected to Ely’s book.
22  This point requires 
some development.  We need to retrace with a bit of care what Ely’s argument was, and 
also what it was not. 
IV 
Ely’s topic was that old constitutional chestnut, judicial review, and especially 
Warren-Court-style, “activist” judicial review.  For writers most strenuously opposed to 
such a practice and its acceptance by Americans⎯we can mention as examples Robert 
Bork at around the time Ely was writing Democracy and Distrust and Jeremy Waldron 
 
 17.  Tribe,  supra n. 1, at 1079-80. 
 18.  Id. at 1079. 
 19.  Id. at 1080. 
 20.  Id. at 1065. 
 21.  Id. at 1080. 
 22.  Tribe,  supra n. 1, at 1080.  MICHELMAN – FINAL  3/6/2008  8:13:18 PM 
20xx]  DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 107 
today23⎯installation of a judicial protectorate against the errors and excesses of elected 
assemblies registers as a failure of nerve, as apostasy from the democratic creed, as a 
stain on democratic honor.24  Not so for John Ely.  Decidedly not so, for what is 
Democracy and Distrust, after all, if not a brief in support of judicial 
activism⎯specifically, the activism of the Warren Court, whose Chief is the book’s 
dedicatee?25 
Ely anchored his defense of Warren to our country’s obvious, unquestionable 
commitment to representative democracy as its form of government.  If that strikes you 
as an unexpected choice for a defense of judicial activism, you must recall that, in Ely’s 
view, the representative democracy that Americans historically have espoused, and that 
anyone has reason to value, is not a bare matter of rule by electoral majorities, or by 
majorities of those elected.26  As most fully and forcefully shown by James E. 
Fleming,27 but also as immediately spotted by Tribe,28 Ely’s standard model of 
representative democracy is a substantively thick conception, reflecting a distinct and 
contentious idea of rightness in politics.  It is, in fact, a prescriptive and idealized version 
of liberal interest-group pluralism,29 dedicated to the thoroughly substantive proposition 
that everyone is to have an equal chance to count politically for one and no more than 
one.30  American representative democracy thus carries a commitment to maintaining in 
our political order certain conditions⎯the channels of political change to be kept clear, 
systematic occlusions of minorities from those channels to be prevented or offset⎯that 
sitting legislative majorities will always be prone to neglect and even to reverse, unless 
held in check by some external discipline.31  Judicial review for that purpose, which Ely 
 
 23.  See e.g. Robert Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. 
L.Q. 695 (1971); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971); 
Waldron, supra n. 13; Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 Oxford J. Leg. 
Stud. 18 (1993). 
 24.  See Richard D. Parker, Democratic Honor: Liberal and Populist, 39 Har. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 
291 (2004); see also Frank I. Michelman, Family Quarrel, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1163, 1164-70 (1996) 
(discussing Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy 278 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (diagnosing and criticizing tendencies to turn the 
constitutional judiciary into “a pedagogical guardian or regent” for a people despairing of its own competence 
to govern itself)). 
 25.  See Ely, supra n. 10, at v (dedication), 73-75 (Warren Court activism). 
  26.  For a more strictly majoritarian-proceduralist view, see Waldron, supra n. 11, at ch. 5; Waldron, supra 
n. 13, at 1388 (“[F]or legislatures, we use a version of [majority decision] to choose representatives and we use 
a version of [majority decision] for decisionmaking among representatives.  The theory is that together these 
provide a reasonable approximation of the . . . application of the values underlying [majority decision] to the 
citizenry as a whole.”). 
 27.  See generally Fleming, supra n. 14, at 19-36. 
 28.  See Tribe, supra n. 1, at 1077-78 (“Why should politics be open to equal participation by all?  Doesn’t 
that norm itself presuppose some substantive vision of human rights?”) (emphasis in original). 
 29.  Ely,  supra n. 10, at 102, 135 (connecting representation reinforcement to “pluralist political theory”). 
 30.  Id. at 100 (construing the Constitution as a “scheme designed to ensure that in the making of 
substantive choices the decision process will be open to all on something approaching an equal basis, with the 
decision-makers held to a duty to take into account the interests of all those their decisions affect”).  Ely 
thought of his favored conception of representative democracy as a kind of “applied utilitarianism.”  John Hart 
Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 Ind. L.J. 399, 407 (1978).  He also saw it as 
connected to the moral conception of political equality⎯of ‘“equal concern and respect in the design and 
administration of . . . political institutions”’⎯championed by Ronald Dworkin.  Ely, supra n. 10, at 82 (quoting 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180 (Harvard U. Press 1977)). 
 31.  Ely,  supra n. 10, at 103. MICHELMAN – FINAL  3/6/2008  8:13:18 PM 
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dubbed “representation-reinforcing” review, and with which he found the practice and 
the preaching of the Warren Court to be mainly in line, was thus, by Ely’s argument, the 
opposite of democracy-defeating; it was democracy maintaining⎯assuming, of course, 
that you bought into Ely’s normatively loaded, substantively enriched account of what 
democracy is and is for. 
Ely claimed a number of institutional advantages for his process-perfecting line of 
justification of activist review, as compared with attempts to justify the sort of roving  
judicial guardianship of liberal rights he was opposing.32  Judicial review keyed to 
representation reinforcement, Ely claimed, fits much better with any plausible claim of a 
special competence in judges than does the idea of a judicial police against deviations 
from fundamental values.33  It thus also fits better with widespread popular 
understandings of limits on the judicial role in a representative democracy.34  But Ely 
did not let his justification of the Warren Court ride solely on a thickly normative 
conception of representative democracy plucked, as it were, out of thin air by John Ely in 
the role of free-floating political pundit.  He also found for his view a clear warrant in 
facts of national history and national positive legislation, specifically in the legislation of 
that law we call the Constitution of the United States.  In a performance of what he 
called “the ultimate interpretivism,”35 Ely argued at length that the text and structure of 
the Constitution as written and ratified conform persuasively to the same normative 
program for a representative democracy that he also found most satisfyingly explains the 
activist role of the Warren Court36⎯thus neatly flipping “democratic theory” from a 
condemnation into an endorsement of that Court’s performance in office.37 
V 
Enter Laurence Tribe.  As a skeptic early into the fray, in a short and sharp work 
that achieved preëminence in a field not lacking other worthy entrants,38 Tribe in his 
“Persistence” essay skewered the idea that you could purge controversial substance out 
of constitutional-legal discourses just by getting courts to stick faithfully to a large, 
normative plan for a representative democracy that you (and let us even say everyone 
agrees on this) have found ensconced in the Constitution and the American way.39  
Tribe’s assault on this idea proceeds in three principal steps, which combine to show 
how the Constitution’s plan as written poses to anyone seeking to follow it, including 
any judge, the need to answer more than a scattering of daunting, large questions of 
value-ordering⎯indeed questions of “the very sort [that] the process-perfecters are at 
 
 32.  See e.g. id. at 43 (naming judicial exegesis of “fundamental values” as the “traditional competitor” to an 
equally untenable, clause-bound interpretivism). 
 33.  See id. at 101-02 (asserting a special competence of lawyers and judges in matters of fair process). 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  Id. at 87-88. 
 36.  See Ely, supra n. 10, at 88-101. 
 37.  Id. at 88-89 n. *. 
 38.  See Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory⎯And Its Future, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 223, 
232-35 (1981); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to 
Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L.J. 1037, 1045-57 (1980). 
 39.  See e.g. Ely, supra n. 10, at 77 (referring to “the American system of representative democracy”). MICHELMAN – FINAL  3/6/2008  8:13:18 PM 
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such pains to avoid,” questions of “substantive rights and values.”40 
The showing starts out with a relatively obvious and mild point.  Among leitmotif 
principles expressly laid down by the Constitution, which Americans surely will find 
emblematic of that instrument’s special character and spirit, we find several⎯anti-
slavery, anti-establishment, religious freedom, protection for private property and 
contracts⎯that cannot plausibly or without contortion of sense be entirely reduced to 
requirements or preconditions for a representative-democratic process.  That is a point 
that Ely himself had seen fit to grant up front, if somewhat coyly.41  “[G]iven the 
complexity of the document,” Ely wrote in a telling footnote, “the argument from the 
nature of the Constitution . . . must be qualified in any event.”42  Ely plainly felt that this 
concession did no real damage to his claim that the written Constitution’s central and 
dominant meaning⎯its “mainstream”43⎯is the plan it adumbrates for a representative-
democratic form of government, a sort of plan that would seem tendentiously hostile to 
the judicial excursions into so-called “unenumerated” rights⎯whether under the heads 
of “due process,” “equal protection,” “privileges or immunities,” or “rights retained by 
the people”⎯that Ely was most intent on criticizing.44 
So Tribe needed to go further, and he knew it.  “Our constitutional reality,” he 
said, poses problems for process theory that cut “deeper” than the mere fact of the 
Constitution’s inclusion of a small handful of substantive guarantees.
45  How so?   
Because “[e]ven the Constitution’s most procedural prescriptions cannot be applied in 
the absence of [theory] whose derivation demands precisely the kinds of controversial 
substantive choices” that in Ely’s version of representative democracy belong properly to 
the electorate and its representatives.46  This subtle second step in Tribe’s showing⎯this 
hoisting of Ely on his own petard⎯is far more damaging than the first to the idea of 
substantively non-controversial judicial review (assuming for now that such was Ely’s 
idea), precisely because it does not depend on defeating Ely’s grand interpretative claim, 
a feat that is hard to pull off because that claim is, after all, a matter of . . . well . . . 
interpretation. 
Here is what I mean: We can grant, if you like (although many will balk), that the 
Constitution itself makes plain the framers’ project to create a governmental system of 
representative democracy, in which all substantive value orderings, all questions of 
substantive rights and values, would be left to the people and their elected 
representatives acting free of external oversight.  One still must ask whether the project 
was one that could possibly have been carried out under the Constitution they wrote (let 
alone any they might have written).  Tribe’s answer is “no,” and he backs it up with force 
and insight.  He shows that the Constitution’s ostensibly process-centered norms⎯those 
regarding structural and adjudicative due process as well as those regarding democratic 
 
 40.  Tribe,  supra n. 1, at 1064. 
 41.  See Ely, supra n. 10, at 92-101. 
 42.  Id. at 88-89 n. *. 
 43.  Id. at 100-01. 
 44.  See U.S. Const. amend. V (due process); id. at amend. IX (rights retained by the people); id. at amend. 
XIV (privileges or immunities, due process, equal protection); Ely, supra n. 10, at 14-41. 
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suffrage and elections⎯are so incompletely specified as to require, at the stage of 
application to cases, resort by judges to value-ordering choices apparently not different 
in kind or contentiousness from those that a court confronts in resolving (say) whether 
the freedom of an adult couple to set the terms of their own sexual intimacies is 
encompassed in the liberty protected by the due process clauses.47 
Tribe’s third step extended his second into a critique of Ely’s “core ‘process 
value,’” that of “protecting certain minorities from perennial defeat in the political 
arena.”48  Tribe showed that you could not say which minorities to protect without 
substantive theorizing to establish “which groups are exercising fundamental rights and 
which are not,” or which “hierarchical visions are substantively out of bounds . . . as a 
justification for government action.”49 
All told, Tribe’s refutation of the likelihood that representation-reinforcing review 
under our Constitution could economize measurably on judicial resort to choices and 
determinations of substantive values was deft and strong.  But what I find most striking 
in his treatment, from today’s vantage point, is the way in which Tribe made the 
publication of Ely’s book an occasion for launching a distinctly deeper and wider 
reflection, the ultimate “puzzle” toward which his title gestures, that of the onset and 
persistence of the impossible, destined-to-failure aspiration to purge controversial 
substance out of constitutional discourse, when strictly speaking Ely need not be 
understood as joining any such project as that. 
Now this, I must grant, is a point I have come only recently to grasp, under strong 
tutelage from James Fleming.50  It is all the same true.  Ely’s book is, to repeat, a brief in 
support of Warren Court activism.  The brief takes the form of a defense of 
“representation-reinforcing” judicial review or, in other words, activist judicial review in 
aid of Ely’s favored, substantive-value-laden model of a representative-democratic form 
of government.51  That entails, of course, a defense, as apt and right for this country, of 
the model that the judges are expected to support by activist exercise of their review 
powers.  But then to vindicate the rightness for us of the model is ipso facto to vindicate 
the rightness for us of the values⎯say, of equality of concern and respect⎯that animate 
and infuse the model.  Vindication of the rightness for us of a set of substantive value 
commitments was thus a crucial part of Ely’s self-assigned task in Democracy and 
Distrust. 
Granted, Ely’s vindication of the values and of the ideal model of a representative 
democracy they imply would not necessarily have to take the form of a direct, moral-
philosophical defense of them by him.  In fact, it may seem that no respectable defense 
by Ely of any constitutional-interpretive proposition could take that form.  How could the 
man who derided philosophical “reason” as a laughably arbitrary basis for counter-
 
 47.  See  id. at 1067-72 (asserting that process-focused judicial review requires “a developed theory of 
fundamental rights that are secured against the state”). 
 48.  Id. at 1072. 
 49.  Id. at 1072-76; see Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1911-12, 1912 n. 68 (2004) (applying his analysis in “Persistence” in 
a critique of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003)). 
 50.  Fleming,  supra n. 14, at 26-27. 
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majoritarian judicial dictations of constitutional law⎯“We like Rawls, you like Nozick.  
We win, 6-3.”52⎯purport to defend the project of activist, representation-reinforcing 
constitutional interpretation and application by judges on grounds of the philosophical 
verity of any set of values?  For Ely, it seems, what would finally justify and require 
representation-reinforcing judicial review in the United States was not the authority of 
Bentham or Mill, or even of someone more American, say Robert Dahl in his normative-
philosophical mode.53  It was rather a substantive political ideal found already inscribed 
in the positive legislation and surrounding practice that Americans at large accept as their 
country’s political and legal constitution, or constitutional law. 
But of course a substantive, value-laden political ideal thus inscribed is still a 
substantive political ideal.  It is still presumably contentious to whatever extent is 
presumed to hold true for substantive claims as a class.  You do not take the 
contentiousness out of the substance, or out of choices regarding its most apt effectuation 
in hard and disputed cases, by arguing, as a matter of interpretation, that a valid law (the 
Constitution) enacts it.  Duly enacted though it be, in play here is a substantive moral 
theory of good and right government.  There it sits, in plain view, at the foundation of 
Ely’s argument.  Nor is this some embarrassing secret that Ely’s critics have had to work 
at exposing.  Ely never made any bones about it.  He proclaimed from the beginning his 
theory’s dependence on a substantive, grounding conception⎯“the American system of 
representative democracy”54⎯and indeed he took quite a few pages to expound that 
conception and its moral underpinnings.55 
Not only was Ely unabashed about the substantive commitments embedded in his 
normative model of representative democracy.  I see nothing to suggest he would have 
felt any need to deny that judicial applications of the Constitution’s relatively abstract, 
incompletely specified principles of pluralist-egalitarian representative democracy would 
require courts to make substantive value choices, or even that the requisite choices might 
turn out to be no less demanding of value-based reasoning by judges than are those 
involved in, say, modern substantive due process.  It was not Ely’s contention, as far as I 
can see, that courts in this country should avoid entanglement in controversial, value-
based reasoning (or “choice” if that is what you want to call it).  It was his contention 
that, for the sake of the American commitment, both historically factual and morally 
commendable, to the representative-democratic ideal, courts should conscientiously 
strain to limit such entanglements to cases in which upholding that commitment required 
them.  But the difference, then, between Ely and, say, John Rawls was not over whether 
judges should be imposing on the country their own controversial but honest-best 
interpretations, specifications, and orderings of incompletely specified, abstract values; it 
was over how the controlling, abstract values should be framed and conceived. 
 
 52.  Ely,  supra n. 10, at 56, 58. 
 53.  See generally Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 83-151 (Yale U. Press 1989) (offering a 
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Ely’s declared aim was to leave maximum latitude for choice to the operations of a 
representative-democratic procedure, on a certain, substantively robust, egalitarian-
pluralist conception of what that procedure is, while still making judges actively 
responsible for upholding that conception.  Rawls might perfectly aptly have explained 
his aim in exactly parallel terms: To leave maximum latitude for choice to the operations 
of a liberal constitutional-democratic procedure, on a certain, substantively robust 
conception of what that procedure is, while still making the judges actively responsible 
for upholding that conception.  Thus the difference between Rawls and Ely is exactly on 
a par with the difference between Rawls and, let us say, Robert Nozick.  You want to 
know why Roe v Wade came out as it did?  “We like Rawls, you like Ely, we win, [7-
2].”56 
Granted, neither Ely’s nor Rawls’s constitutional-interpretative prescription for 
judges comes down to a transparently simple drill that any fool can easily follow.   
(Granted, you or I or Larry Tribe might say that once Ely allows a beachhead for activist 
judicial review for the sake of representation-reinforcement, he has given away too much 
of the store of substantive controversy to make the rest worth trying to save.)  But neither 
is Ely’s an incomprehensible prescription, any more than Rawls’s is, or one that a 
competent and comprehending judge cannot in good conscience undertake to follow as 
best she can.  Whatever interventions courts may decide to make, Ely meant to say, they 
should stand ready in good faith to explain, to themselves and to others, either in terms 
of some value or values explicitly endorsed by the Constitution or else in terms of the 
Constitution’s overarching, political-normative ideal, that of representative democracy.  
Ely thought he saw too many instances of judges not getting with that program (Roe v. 
Wade, for example), and he condemned them for it.  He did so, for aught we can tell 
from his book, not because he blanched at controversy within the law or at judges laying 
down unprovable, controversial, even divisive constitutional rulings (witness Ely’s 
support for Brown,57 for Reynolds,58 and for judicial invalidations of flag-desecration 
laws59), but because that is what he found was called for by fidelity to a certain, 
substantively loaded ideal of representative democracy that he both thought admirable 
and thought was laid down by America’s positive constitutional legislation, properly 
understood.60 
I conclude that Ely’s book⎯or let me rather say Ely’s text⎯does not reflect, any 
more than A Theory of Justice reflects, an “aspiration  .  .  . to purge constitutional 
discourse of inevitably controversial claims about substantive rights and values.”61  Nor, 
hence, does it obviously fit with or explain Tribe’s parting shots in “Persistence,” his 
questions about the reasons anyone might have for such an aspiration, or about the 
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prospects for constitutional theory in a situation defined in terms of our being stuck in its 
grip. 
VI 
The aspiration to a constitutional law that evades substantive controversy, I have 
argued, cottons more to Rawls than to Ely.62  Its wellspring lies not in the bottom-line 
concern for democracy that drives DPCT, but in the bottom-line concern for legitimacy 
that drives LPCT.63  It is LPCT, not DPCT, that posits the idea of a governmental 
system⎯thus a body of constitutional law⎯agreeable to everyone, as an answer to the 
question of the possibility of legitimate government in conditions of widespread, 
intractable, potentially divisive disagreements over matters of fundamental rights and 
values that ground-level governmental acts inevitably engage.  If I am right about this, 
then Tribe in “Persistence” does seem to have gotten LPCT and DPCT conflated or 
confused. 
If so, he has a pretty good excuse.  In Part II, I worked hard to surface differences 
between DPCT and LPCT.  Now I want to offer a restatement aimed at highlighting their 
confusing similarities.  To start with, these two types of theory proceed from a shared set 
of commonplace presuppositions.  Both DPCT and LPCT divide a country’s law into 
two layers (so to speak), call them “ordinary” and “constitutional.”  Ordinary law is all of 
a country’s law that is made by ordinary lawmakers⎯they being, simply, the officials 
and official bodies whose choices and actions are decisive of the content of the ordinary 
law, subject only to the condition of consonance with constitutional law.  In the 
constitutional democracies comprising the field of interest to both DPCT and LPCT, 
ordinary lawmakers consist of elected legislative assemblies, aided by courts interpreting 
and applying their enactments, and they may also include courts exercising powers to 
elaborate and develop the prescriptive content of a corpus of “common” or “judge-made” 
law. 
For the purposes of both DPCT and LPCT, constitutional law is law directed to 
establishing and prescribing the terms on which ordinary law is validly produced.  Both 
DPCT and LPCT confront and debate the question of having these terms include controls 
on the permissible or mandatory content or “substance” of the law that ordinary 
lawmakers make (a “bill of rights”).  Either way, in the sight of both, constitutional law 
is law meant to bind the operations of ordinary lawmakers, hence it is not amenable to 
change by ordinary lawmakers using ordinary lawmaking procedures, and furthermore is 
law that courts of law (at least one such court) are normally expected to enforce⎯to 
make effective by some sort of corrective judicial remedy⎯against ordinary lawmaking 
operations that are found to stray from its prescriptions. 
Here is a further point of commonality between DPCT and LPCT.  A theorist of 
either stripe may find reasons to urge that the constitutional law to be enforced by 
reviewing courts against ordinary lawmaking operations be crafted and construed, 
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insofar as possible, so as to cover matters of system and process only, leaving all (other) 
choices of government policy, and the orderings of substantive values that such choices 
encode or entail, to be decided by the system and process that courts are charged with 
upholding. 
But if LPCT and DPCT may possibly agree about restricting judicially enforceable 
constitutional law to matters of process, still their bottom-line reasons will always be 
different.  For DPCT, disfavor of judicial dictation of substance springs directly from the 
fact that the dictation is judicial⎯that is, it comes from democratically unaccountable 
judges.  DPCT’s rock-bottom commitment is to an ideal of democratic government that 
directly rejects judicial dictations of substance, saving those required for the preservation 
of democracy itself.  For LPCT, the counter-democratic character of judicial dictation is 
not in itself an objection to substantive judicial review.64  To any question about 
including this or that judicially enforceable restriction on allowable legislative substance 
in a country’s system-shaping constitutional law, LPCT responds in the first instance not 
by asking whether the inclusion advances or detracts from democracy, but by asking 
whether inclusion advances or detracts from systemic legitimacy, the system’s fairly 
ascribable agreeability to all.  We have seen how John Rawls answers in a way that is 
flatly inconsistent with DPCT.65 
But now matters grow tricky, because, pace Rawls, an elementary concern for 
legitimacy may lead other theorists⎯Jeremy Waldron is the best example⎯quite 
directly to a derivative concern for democracy, in the strongly procedural sense of a fair 
system of majority rule, free of any restraint on political outcomes save possibly those 
required for maintenance of the democratic procedural system “in . . . good working 
order.”66  Rawls and Waldron differ, but not on making legitimacy the starting point, 
which Waldron plainly does, thus placing himself squarely within LPCT.67  They differ 
down the line, on whether democracy, in Waldron’s strongly procedural sense of the 
term, is a sine qua non for systemic legitimacy. 
Waldron affirms it.  Rawls denies it, affirming rather that legitimacy requires 
constitutionalizations of substance beyond any that Waldron or Ely could accept.  A 
theory such as Rawls’s thus makes fully manifest the deep difference between LPCT and 
DPCT, whereas a theory like Waldron’s makes the difference harder to see.  When 
Waldron’s theory is on the table, the visible distinction between DPCT and LPCT is 
slight.  All that is left to mark the theory as either DPCT or LPCT is its starting premise, 
assuming we can detect what that is.  When the starting point is legitimacy, and 
democracy comes in only secondarily, derivatively, inferentially⎯that is, as a perceived 
requirement for legitimacy⎯the theory is LPCT; otherwise, DPCT.  So if the theorist 
explicitly starts from legitimacy, as Waldron does⎯leaving open, at least in principle, 
the possibility that he would accept Rawls-style liberal constitutionalism if we could 
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persuade him of the latter’s superior conduciveness to liberal legitimacy⎯we can 
confidently classify his theory as LPCT.  In other instances, however, classification may 
become difficult to the point of guesswork.  Might that be true of Ely’s theory? 
I have so far treated Ely’s theory as a plain instance of DPCT, but what makes me 
so certain?  I can honestly say I know of no word ever written or spoken by Ely to 
suggest that he was deriving his commitment to democracy from a prior commitment to 
legitimacy.  I recall no claim from him regarding the presumed agreeability to everyone 
of a representative-democratic governmental system.  So far as I can tell, he simply 
thought that representative democracy, minimally encumbered by judges, was 
right⎯right for our country, at any rate⎯in virtue of that system’s implementation of 
primary values of equality of concern, respect, and political agency, together with its 
having been prescribed for us by positive constitutional legislation.  But what, actually, 
is the distance between thinking that and thinking that minimally encumbered democracy 
is right in virtue of its presumable maximum achievable agreeability to everyone as a 
system of government for a diverse society like ours, whose members cannot hope to 
find agreement on ground-level matters of substance⎯in other words, is to be preferred 
on grounds of legitimacy?  That there is a notional difference there I do not doubt, but 
how large and telling an applied difference it can ever make is another question. 
VII 
We stand now at the verge of explaining how it might have been that Tribe, 
addressing Ely in “Persistence,” could easily and excusably have conflated two kinds of 
constitutional theory⎯DPCT and LPCT⎯that are conceptually distinct but that are not 
readily distinguishable when Ely’s is the case specifically in view.  Ely’s, one might say, 
is a case that we can read one way or the other depending on where we are coming from, 
and Tribe just happened to read it as LPCT. 
So far, so good, except for “just happened.”  Tribe was coming from somewhere in 
particular, I now wish to suggest, and that facts add to the picture a reason why Tribe, in 
particular, may have read Ely as LPCT⎯that reason being that Tribe himself had been 
there, was coming from there.  For indeed we do find him there⎯I will show you just 
below⎯among the early progenitors of the LPCT of our time.  In treating Ely as an 
instance of LPCT, Tribe may have been projecting onto Ely his own recent reflections 
about a possible cure in constitutional law for the problem of liberal legitimacy.  Thus 
when Tribe, in “Persistence,” writes of the impossible aspiration’s grip on “our thought” 
and asks what that fact says about “our situation” and its prospects for constitutional 
theory, we can take those first-person plural possessives quite literally. 
 Consider some dates.  “Persistence” appeared in 1980, Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism⎯a watershed philosophical statement of LPCT⎯not until 1993.  Rawls had 
published important and widely read anticipatory essays along the way, but not until 
after Tribe had written “Persistence.”68  Publications by other liberals on similar tracks, 
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such as Thomas Nagel and Charles Larmore, also post-dated “Persistence.”69 
It seems that Tribe was ahead of them all⎯I don’t mean in “Persistence,” I mean 
in his Harvard Law Review “Foreword” of 1973, “Toward a Model of Roles in the Due 
Process of Life and Law.”70  In hindsight, Tribe’s Foreword (as I shall nickname it) 
appears to have LPCT affinities.  LPCT, remember, is theory on the lookout for a 
constitution that everyone can fairly be called on to treat as legitimation-worthy, in 
circumstances where we cannot reasonably expect or demand a convergence of 
judgments on the moral merits of sundry laws and other governmental acts and 
outcomes, and hopes thus arise of grounding legitimacy on the acceptability to all of the 
constituted processes or system whence the outcomes issue.71  L P C T  w o r k s  a t  
developing design standards for such a constitution’s normative content; it produces 
arguments to support the standards it develops; and it promotes and defends efforts by 
judges and other officials to construe and apply the constitution we have so as to bring it 
as close to the proposed standards as a decent regard for text and legality will allow.  
Tribe’s Foreword fits that profile nicely. 
It does so by proposing a change of subject, or of perspective,72 for substantive 
due process argumentation in constitutional law, using the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Roe v. Wade as its chief example of what not to do.  The Court, Tribe says, should strive 
to avoid a reading of the due process guarantee that allows or invites direct assessments 
by official bodies of any sort, be they legislative or judicial, of the substantive 
merits⎯the rationality or proportionality⎯of any proposal to regulate abortion by law 
(defining abortion, in effect as termination of a pregnancy resulting in the death of a 
fetus that has not yet, in the view of a secular consensus, become a person protected by 
moral and civil laws against homicide73).  True, the choice under assessment is framed 
as one about the comparative merits of alternative possible states of legal permission and 
restriction of abortion choices, not directly about the merits of any particular choice.  The 
assessment nevertheless necessarily involves the official assessor in his or her own 
appraisal of the comparative weights of substantive considerations pro and con abortion 
choices.  Any such appraisal that will have the force of law behind it, whether done by a 
court or by a legislature, thus comes too close to indistinguishability from a coercive 
public judgment on a moral matter regarding which no societal consensus exists or can 
be expected⎯meaning (this is my language, not Tribe’s) so close as to pose an 
unacceptable hazard to an overridingly important public value. 
Partly in order to avoid this hazard (we postpone for a moment the question of 
what the overriding public value is), Tribe proposes a recasting of the question posed by 
constitutional law from what the Roe opinion too carelessly makes it look like.74  Instead 
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of asking for official assessments of the weights and balances of the merits factors 
entering into some category of choice that agents in civil society may face, the 
constitutional law of substantive due process is more accurately⎯and 
satisfyingly⎯understood as directed to a different sort of question, one about who gets 
to weigh and decide the merits authoritatively: Shall it be the legislature?  The pregnant 
woman?  Her husband or other putative prospective father?  Her parents?  Her doctor?  If 
more than one of these, in what rank or combination?  The law of substantive due 
process, or much of it, Tribe says, is better conceived as directed to the allocation of 
authority to decide a question or make a choice⎯a question of process⎯than to 
assessments of the substantive moral and other merits of one choice or another.75 
Tribe argues in favor of a decision-privatizing doctrine⎯a “personal question 
doctrine”⎯under the aegis of due process.76  In places, he seems to draw that suggestion 
from what we may call primary value-based grounds, roughly that individuals have 
moral rights to make certain decisions untrammeled by societal judgments, rights that 
any decent legal order should honor.77  But also plainly making an appearance in the 
Foreword is a consideration of a distinctly different ilk, directed to the distinctly political 
value of political legitimacy.  Visibly at work is an appreciation of legitimacy’s 
dependence on the law’s success in evading certain kinds of virulent controversy over 
values⎯a hallmark of LPCT. 
Tribe’s Foreword does not speak in the terms of “legitimacy” and “political 
values.”  Evident all the same is its anticipation of the concerns and hopes that others 
would come to inscribe in that vocabulary.  In the view of the Foreword, an appreciable 
virtue of a constitutional allocation of authority over certain classes of decisions to 
private parties is that it does in fact assist the law in evading certain kinds of virulent 
conflict over values.78  By privatizing a class of decisions, you head-off divisive political 
struggles over them that would otherwise be sure to arise, and so also reduce the dangers 
such struggles pose to political legitimacy and stability.79  (If early-term abortions are as 
morally atrocious as some of us believe, and if we can prohibit them by law, then the 
struggle to prohibit them by law is one to which some of us must be ceaselessly 
committed.)  Privatization-by-constitution, for this legitimacy-serving purpose, is a 
staple strategy of LPCT.80  We can evade the political hazards of disagreement by 
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 78.  See id. at 21-22 (observing that legislatures are caught in a “whirlpool of religious controversy” as long 
as they are thought to retain a “decisional role” over abortion); id. at 24 (referring to “the continual pressures to 
which the milieu subjects lawmakers as long as they retain a decisionmaking role”).  Privatization of decisional 
authority is the dimension of role-allocation with which the Foreword is centrally concerned.  See id. at 15-16. 
 79.  See id. at 22 (endorsing the view that the Constitution aims to prevent “‘a union of government and 
religion [that] tends to destroy government and to degrade religion’”) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 
431 (1962)). 
  80. A widely known statement is Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in 
Constitutionalism and Democracy 1 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., Cambridge U. Press 1988).  See id. at 
20-21 (citing Rawls as exemplary of the theme); McCarthy, supra n. 6, at 56 (explaining liberal legitimacy 
gains expected from a shift of debate from the level of “opposed beliefs” (abortion-or-no) to the level of a 
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agreeing to disagree, each attending to his or her own vine and fig tree.  What could be 
more reasonable?  Cannot everyone be expected to agree to that, for legitimacy’s sake, 
for at least some classes of choices? 
Which classes of choices?  Tribe’s Foreword does not insist that all questions of 
constitutional limits on state regulations of private choices should be cast into role-
allocation terms, it only says that some should.  The class that draws Tribe’s chief 
attention in the Foreword is choices dependent on value determinations for which there is 
no apparent basis outside of sectarian religious doctrine⎯that being exactly how the 
Foreword depicts the core of the debate over the moral merits and demerits of abortion.81  
It is religiously inflected battles in the culture wars that the Foreword is especially 
anxious to sidetrack⎯just as, interestingly, it was the experience “the wars of religion” 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that provided John Rawls with an anti-model 
for his version of LPCT.82 
The reason for this is apparent in both cases: It lies in the authors’ belief in the 
special virulence and intractability, the special potential for destruction of political 
stability and legitimacy, of religion-based conflicts over moral values.83  But we also 
find in the Foreword a suggestion of a broader expectation that judicial administration of 
a constitutional law addressed to “the merits of alternative allocations of roles” can be 
made more persuasive to everyone than judicial pronouncements, in the Constitution’s 
name, on “the merits of exercising various roles in particular ways.”84 
VIII 
Tribe’s Foreword stands as an early entry in our generation’s proceduralist turn in 
constitutional theory.  I cannot undertake to gauge its possible contribution to stimulating 
other entries that came later onto the scene; that is a task, if it matters, for someone better 
versed than I in the modes and methods of the history of political ideas.  The point I am 
after here is different.  The fact may be⎯I do not pretend to know⎯that at the time 
Tribe wrote “Persistence,” his rejoinder to John Ely, he was also engaged in reflection on 
the LPCT-type position he had staked out in the Foreword.  Ely may have served Tribe 
as a foil for  .  .  . himself.85  The arguments of impossibility that Tribe mounted in 
“Persistence” against the aspiration to steer constitutional law clear of substantive 
controversy may have been as much a product of his own continuing ruminations about 
the Foreword as of anything written by Ely.  One cannot know.  It does not really matter.  
 
McLellan ed., Oxford U. Press 1977). 
 81.  See Tribe, supra n. 70, at 18-22 (finding that the doctrines of organized religions are currently the only 
available sources for conflicting judgments about when life begins). 
 82.  See Rawls, supra n. 3, at xxiii-xxiv. 
 83.  See Tribe, supra n. 70, at 22 (treating government entanglement in religious controversy as a special 
“source of alarm”). 
 84.  Id. at 51. 
  85.  I note for the record Tribe’s remark in a memorial tribute to Ely: 
[N]ow, years later, I’ve come to see a convergence between the theme of personal and political self-
governance around which my own theorizing revolves and the basic theme John laid out so 
elegantly nearly a quarter century ago [in Democracy and Distrust]. 
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What does matter is that Tribe’s critique of Ely in “Persistence” did in fact raise 
questions that hound LPCT to this day and that have not yet, so far as I know, been put to 
rest. 
Responding to perceptions of unbridgeable disagreement in society over matters of 
fundamental right and fundamental value, LPCT offers a deflection of the burden of 
legitimation⎯of the moral defense of governmental and legal coercion⎯from ground-
level political acts to a constitutional system that authorizes them.  But then LPCT may 
further find, as it does in John Rawls’s hands and as I fully expect it would have to in 
Laurence Tribe’s, that a constitutional procedure cannot bear that burden⎯cannot be 
accounted legitimation-worthy⎯if it does not take sides on certain matters of 
fundamental right and value including some obviously quite divisive ones.  And where, 
then, does that land us?  If we cannot look for liberally legitimating convergence on 
judgments of the substantive merits of ground-level political acts, what makes us think 
we can look for liberally legitimating convergence on a constitution that consists, in 
indispensable part, of somewhat abstract but still highly substantive principles and 
standards by which the ground level acts will be judged constitutional or not?  However 
one might answer⎯and answering is no simple matter⎯there can be no doubting the 
question’s force and cogency.  Who that has read Tribe on Ely, in “Persistence,” can 
swear that he did not learn it there? 
Can we avoid the question’s sting by recasting issues of substance into issues of 
process?  By shifting from the question of the merits to that of who gets to decide the 
merits, and then deciding the meta-question in favor of the non-governmental sector?  
Any reader of “Persistence” must come away doubting.  “[A] political conception of 
justice,” it has more recently been written, 
presupposes a certain view of the controversies it would bracket.  For the debate about 
abortion is not only a debate about when human life begins, but also a debate about how 
reasonable it is to abstract from that question for political purposes [that is, by agreeing to 
submit ourselves to a constitutional principle of privatization: of autonomy, privacy, or an 
individual right to choose for oneself].  Opponents of abortion resist the translation from 
moral to political terms because they know that more of their view will be lost in the 
translation . . . .  The moral price of political agreement is far higher if abortion is wrong 
than if it is permissible.86 
Michael Sandel’s riposte to Rawls seems to me entirely in the spirit of Laurence 
Tribe’s riposte to Ely, and, if I am right, to himself as well.  I do not say Sandel learned it 
from Tribe; only that he very well might have. 
IX 
“[W]hat does it say about our situation, and about the prospect for constitutional 
theory, that views so deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip upon our 
thought?”⎯Tribe inquired at the end of “Persistence.”  He did not answer on the spot.  
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This was, he wrote, a matter “to be explored in a later essay.”87 
But answer came there none.  Tribe did later publish a short piece under the title of  
“The Futile Search for Legitimacy,”88 but no answer is there to be found.  Futile, Tribe 
argued, is the search for sovereign solutions to worries about unconstrained exercises of 
power by unelected judges.89  Futile, yes, and dangerous to boot, because any purported 
solution will “encourage us all to forget that no exercise of power, in any society the 
planet has ever seen, is genuinely unproblematic.”  (I hope you hear the resonance with 
LPCT.) 
What follows?  That we should stop asking the question of the moral defensibility 
of the force of law tout court?  The annals of political-theoretic speculation do, after all, 
suggest several sorts of possible grounds for dismissing as futile any search for political 
legitimacy in that, our chosen sense.  If power is an unavoidable fact of social life, if 
power has to reside somewhere in society, then obsessing over justification for its 
exercise might be a mistake, a waste of time and energy better spent on something else.  
Alternatively (think of Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor), moral justification for official 
power is always unquestionably present, because official power is inseparable from 
social order and an extant regime of social order is always and obviously preferable, on 
moral grounds, to the alternative of Hobbesian disorder.  And anyway, the question of 
legitimacy is always already settled, and acceptably so, by brute social facts of adherence 
and acceptance of the extant regime by a preponderance of a country’s people⎯facts that 
occur independently of anyone’s conscious reflection, assessment, or judgment regarding 
the respect-worthiness of a regime, so why worry? 
Does any of that sound like the Laurence Tribe we know?  The man, I mean, who 
distances himself from the companies of “cynics,” of “legal nihilists,” of those who 
regard constitutional law as “a legitimating mask for what those in power can get away 
with?”90  When that Tribe speaks in that chapter of the futility of the search for 
legitimacy, he cannot mean that the question is one we may ever permit ourselves to stop 
asking.  Unanswerable with finality though the question may be, the persistency of its 
demand on our attentions should pose no puzzle to our man.  For what achievement, after 
all, could we more honor him than for his own persistent contributions to advancement 
of the quest? 
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